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Reason and Necessity: the Descent of the Philosopher-Kings 
One of the reasons why one might find it worthwhile to study philosophers of late antiquity is 
the fact that they often have illuminating things to say about Plato and Aristotle. Plotinus, in 
particular, was a diligent and insightful reader of those great masters. Michael Frede was 
certainly of that view, and when he wrote that ”[o]ne can learn much more from Plotinus 
about Aristotle than from most modern accounts of the Stagirite”, he would not have objected, 
I presume, to the claim that Plotinus is also extremely helpful for the study of Plato.1 In this 
spirit I wish to discuss a problem that has occupied modern Plato scholars for a long time and 
I will present a Plotinian answer to that problem. The problem concerns the descent of the 
philosopher kings in Plato’s Republic. 
I 
When Socrates, Glaucon and Adeimantus construct in words the just city-state, it soon 
becomes apparent that this state has to be ruled by people who do not seek office, who are 
even positively disinclined to rule. Already in book I Socrates claims that “if there should be a 
city of good men only, immunity from office-holding would be as eagerly contended for as 
office is now…” (347D).2 It is repeated in a crucial passage in book VII: “For the fact is, dear 
friend, said I, if you can discover a better way of life than office-holding for your future 
rulers, a well-governed city becomes a possibility” (520E-521A). Paradoxically, then, it is a 
necessary condition for the just and well-governed city to be ruled by people who do not want 
to rule. To ensure this, there must exist a way of life that is better than ruling for the future 
rulers. At this stage of the Republic, this better way has already been found. For the future 
rulers have been identified as philosophers, by which Plato here means people who have left 
the Cave and spend their time on the contemplation of Forms, most importantly for our 
                                                
I should like to thank Don Morrison, Wolfgang Mann, and Peter Turner for their helpful 
comments on earlier drafts of this paper. 
1 M. Frede, Essays in Ancient Philosophy (Oxford, 1987), xxi. 
2 Translations are Shorey’s. Where I deviate from Shorey, I give the Greek in brackets.  
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purposes the Form of the Just, which they see, as they do all other Forms, in the light of the 
Form of the Good. And they love it: Socrates tells us that the contemplating philosophers 
believe that “while still living they have been transported to the Islands of the Blest” (519C), a 
wonderful privilege which one usually is granted only after death (and, of course, it is granted 
only to a blessed few).3 They thus greatly delight in their contemplative lives and rightly 
consider themselves happy and their lives blissful—and no doubt better than that of any ruler. 
This gives rise to the problem I am going to discuss: on the one hand, the city needs, as rulers, 
philosophers. But on the other hand, the rulers-to-be do not want to rule. From the point of 
view of the city it is clear, given the argument of the Republic, that this sort of ruler is needed. 
However, prima facie it is not at all clear what could make the philosophers descend back into 
the Cave. Why abandon (at least for extended periods of time) their blissful lives of 
contemplation and engage in the toilsome works of ruling? What could possibly motivate the 
philosophers to return to the Cave? 
This is one problem. But what is worse, there is a second, closely related, problem: in book 
II Socrates has been challenged by Glaucon to resume the discussion of book I and to show 
that justice is always preferable to injustice. A related claim recurs several times during their 
discussion: it has to be shown that the just are happier than the unjust (352D).4 Let us concede 
that it would be just of the philosophers to descend and that it would be unjust of them to 
remain on what seems to them to be the Islands of the Blessed.5 Now even if we find an 
answer to the first question and detect some sort of motivation for them to descend, the 
following question still needs an answer: by descending, the future rulers seem to sacrifice 
                                                
3 Already according to Pindar only people who have kept “their souls free from all unjust 
deeds” (Pi. Ol. 2, 69-70) are allowed to migrate to the Island of the Blessed. Hades awaits the 
rest of us. 
4 See also 427D, 445A, 612B. 
5 It is just for the philosophers to descend because they owe it to the city. I shall come back to 
this claim below. However, I wish to emphasize at the outset that throughout this paper I shall 
simply take it for granted that this is a just demand and shall not be concerned with the 
question of why the demand is just or whether this claim is justified at all. 
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their happiness (or part thereof). Thus, if the philosophers do what is just, namely rule the fine 
city of Kallipolis (as it is playfully called at 527C), then they are not (maximally) happy, but 
if they continue enjoying the bliss of contemplation (and thus are maximally happy) and 
thereby ignore what they owe to the city, they are not just. So it still seems possible that under 
these circumstances at least some unjust people (i.e. those who continue their contemplation 
and ignore what they owe to the city) are happier than the just (who do not ignore what they 
owe to the city and for this reason take on the burden of ruling).6 But if so, then Socrates has 
not fulfilled his promise to show that the just are always happier than the unjust: those who do 
not descend and continue their blissful activity of contemplation despite being called to rule, 
are unjust but, or so it seems, happier than their fellow contemplators who follow the call of 
duty and sacrifice (part of) their own happiness in order to do what is just.7 
One might try to dissolve the problems by claiming that acting justly in the Cave is 
actually a necessary constitutive part of the happiness of the philosopher kings, in the sense 
that it is an activity whose exercise (not only instrumentally, but per se) makes a philosopher 
king happy and without which they would not be happy.8 If so, then the problems would not 
even occur, and it would be easy to see why the philosopher-kings rule: they strive for 
happiness and acting justly would make them happy. However, such an account cannot 
explain why the philosopher kings do not want to descend. As I claimed above they are 
positively disinclined to. Their disinclination does not only become apparent from the fact 
                                                
6 In phrasing the problem in this way, I presuppose that a person who acts unjustly, is unjust 
and that being just is incompatible with acting unjustly. 
7 In thinking about these problems, I have found particularly helpful R. Kraut, ‘Return to the 
Cave: Republic 519-521’ [‘Return’], in J. J. Cleary (ed.), Proceedings of the Boston Area 
Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, 7 (1991), 43-62; T. Irwin, Plato’s Moral Theory. The 
Early and Middle Dialogues [Moral] (Oxford, 1977); N. White, ‘The Ruler’s Choice’ 
[‘Choice’], Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 68 (1986), 22-46; J. M. Cooper, ‘The 
Psychology of Justice in Plato’ [‘Justice’], American Philosophical Quarterly, 14 (1977), 
151-7 and E. Brown, ‘Justice and Compulsion for Plato’s Philosopher-Rulers’ 
[‘Compulsion’], Ancient Philosophy, 20 (2000), 1-17. I shall not be able to do justice to all 
those valuable contributions.  
8 T. A. Mahoney, ‘Do Plato’s philosopher-rulers sacrifice self-interest to justice?’, Phronesis, 
37 (1992), 265-82. 
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that they prefer the contemplative life to the practical life (and the claim that the rulers of the 
just city do not want to rule is a claim crucial for the project of the Republic), but it is also 
explicitly stated by Socrates in the passage partly quoted above: “… they will not willingly 
(ἑκόντες)9 engage in action, believing that while still living they have been transported to the 
Islands of the Blest” (519C).10 If engaging in (just) action was part of the philosopher’s 
happiness in the way described then it would be hard to see why they would not willingly 
engage in (just) action. 
Another strategy might be to make the weaker claim that the philosopher kings rule only 
because this is a necessary condition for their contemplative lives, and hence, for their 
happiness, without making the assumption that ruling itself is something that makes them 
happy. Reeve is perhaps the most famous proponent of this strategy.11 He takes into account 
the philosopher kings’ unwillingness to rule and believes that they rule “because doing so is 
the best means to their own happiness, that is, to the stable acquisition of as much of the 
pleasure of learning and knowing the truth as possible throughout life” (p. 95). It is the best 
means because “if they do not rule, the Third Polis will be torn apart by civil war. And 
without that polis, even the philosophers cannot be reliably happy throughout life” (p. 202). 
The philosopher’s attitude to ruling, according to Reeve’s reading, is thus purely instrumental. 
They do it because their ruling ensures that they can spend at least part of their time (and more 
time than in any competing scenario) on contemplation (i.e. on the activity they are really 
interested in). 
                                                
9 We should not read ἑκὼν here in Aristotle’s technical sense (which is Aristotle’s 
innovation). Plato rather uses it, I suggest, in the sense in which it is used in non-philosophical 
Greek where it indicates an attitude of desire and where it often is opposed to circumstances 
of ἀνάγκη (cf. R. 360C; Prt. 346B; Phdr. 240C). For the use of ἑκὼν in pre-Platonic Greek 
see G. Rickert, ΕΚΩΝ and ΑΚΩΝ in Early Greek Thought (Atlanta, 1989). 
10 For emphasizing the importance of this, I am much indebted to Eric Brown. See Brown, 
‘Compulsion’, 2. 
11 C. D. C. Reeve, Philosopher-Kings. The Argument of Plato’s Republic (Princeton, 1988). 
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One forceful objection against Reeve’s view has been made by Kraut, who points out that 
there is a gap between the reasons Reeve gives for the descent and those provided in the text.12 
For the philosopher kings learn from Socrates that, when they are told to go down (520C), it is 
a just thing asked of just people. It is just, because, as Socrates tells the philosopher kings, 
“you have received a better and more complete education than the others” (520C). This 
education has been provided by the city and, as Kraut phrases it: “it is just that they should 
repay this debt by using that education for the benefit of the city.”13 
For our purposes it is important to note that if we follow the above strategy there is either 
no intrinsic connection between contemplation and action, or the Forms have two quite 
distinct functions. First, they are the objects of contemplation. In so far as they are objects of 
contemplation and thus, as we shall see, also objects of rational desire, it does not matter that 
they are such things as the Good, the Just etc., i.e. that they are what one might call normative 
entities. The philosophers could just as well contemplate mathematics or any other subject 
which happens to arouse their intellectual curiosity. Second, the Forms have instrumental 
value in that they allow the philosopher kings to organize the city in such a way as to 
maximize the time they can spend on contemplation. For their instrumental value, it might 
well be crucial that the Forms are normative entities, if it is the understanding of those entities 
that makes the ruling of the perfect city most beneficial to the rulers. But the intrinsic value of 
the Forms, what makes them attractive to contemplate, is on this reading only accidentally 
related to their instrumental value. It just so happens that the understanding of what the 
philosopher kings deeply desire to contemplate is also useful (and perhaps necessary) to rule 
the city. 
II 
                                                
12 Kraut, ‘Return’, 50-51. For a critique see also White, ‘Choice’, 25. 
13 Kraut, ‘Return’, 51. 
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At least two important accounts of our problem see an intrinsic link between the 
contemplation of Forms and the action based on that contemplation. Irwin, in his classic 
Plato’s Moral Theory, explains that there need be no conflict between the contemplative view 
(“some of the rational part’s desires will be desires to use reason, especially in philosophical 
knowledge and contemplation”) and the practical view (“the philosopher will want to express 
his knowledge of Justice, Beauty, and the other moral Forms in actions which embody 
them”).14 He explains that the philosopher who values theoretical reasoning “will also have 
reason to value other activities expressing his view of the best activities for all his life, and 
they will include more than philosophical thought.”15 Irwin takes Plato to be assuming that the 
knowledge of the Forms creates a desire to express one’s knowledge in actions, and refers to 
the Symposium and the description there of the work of teachers and legislators who desire to 
propagate virtue. 
Kraut’s view is in crucial ways similar. His core idea is that “the Forms are arranged in a 
systematic order and that the philosopher’s understanding of this order will inspire in her a 
desire to imitate them.”16 He finds this idea in the following passage from the Republic: the 
philosopher, we are told at 500BC, “has no leisure to turn his eyes downward upon the petty 
affairs of men… but he fixes his gaze upon the things of the eternal and unchanging order, 
and seeing that they neither wrong nor are wronged by one another, but all abide in harmony 
as reason bids, he will endeavor to imitate them and, as far as may be, to fashion himself to 
them. Or do you think it possible not to imitate the things to which anyone attaches himself 
with admiration? Impossible, he said” (500C). Now this passage only shows that philosophers 
will imitate the Forms in making themselves as similar as possible to the harmonious world of 
Forms. It does not show, however, that the philosopher desires to shape the world or to rule 
the city accordingly. But Socrates continues as follows: “If, then, I said, some necessity arises 
                                                
14 Irwin, Moral, 236-7. See also T. Irwin, Plato’s Ethics (Oxford, 1995), 313-6. 
15 Irwin, Moral, 237. 
16 Kraut, ‘Return’, 52. 
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for him (τις αὐτῷ ἀνάγκη γένηται) to practice impressing onto the customs of human beings 
(εἰς ἀνѳρώπων ἤѳη τιѳέναι) in public and private the patterns that he visions there, and not 
merely to mould and fashion himself, do you think he will prove a poor craftsman of sobriety 
and justice and all forms of ordinary civic virtue? By no means, he said.” 
If we apply the basic idea of this passage to our problem, then it appears that the 
philosophers will descend in order to shape and rule the city. For the ruling and shaping of the 
city is, I take it, the public part of their realizing in the Cave what they have seen outside of 
the Cave. While this passage indeed shows that action in the Cave is in some way or other a 
consequence of the contemplation of Forms, it does not tell us in what way precisely practical 
activity depends on contemplation. In particular, it does not tell us that the philosopher kings 
desire to practice impressing onto the customs of human beings the patterns that they envision 
there.  
Moreover, it is, I think, of great importance that according to this passage the claim that 
philosophers rule in the light of what they have seen outside of the Cave is implied by the 
consequent of a conditional whose antecedent reads: “if some necessity arises for him”. Thus, 
instead of saying that contemplation inspires a desire in the philosopher to imitate the Forms, 
it only says that this is what the philosopher is going to do, if some necessity arises for him. 
This is a crucial condition to which I shall return. 
There is no passage in the Republic telling us that the philosophers have a desire to 
descend.17 It is true that it is a natural way to take the link between contemplation and action 
so as to avoid the apparent inconsistency so much discussed in the literature. However, if we 
can find an interpretation that (i) preserves the strong link between contemplation and action 
suggested in the passage just discussed, (ii) does so without assuming that the philosopher 
kings desire to descend and (iii) takes into account the necessity mentioned, this interpretation 
                                                
17 Brown, ‘Compulsion’. 
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would, I think, be preferable. For the claim that they desire to descend makes it difficult to 
understand why they are disinclined to do so. 
III 
Let us look more closely at the desires of the soul. In book IX we find a discussion of 
different kinds of desire and pleasure. We learn that each of the three parts of the soul has its 
own kind of desire and its own kind of pleasure (580D).18 First Socrates reminds the reader of 
the three soul parts and characterizes the rational soul part as that with which a human being 
learns. Spirit is characterized as that with which they feel anger. The third and lowest part is 
more difficult to characterize, we are told, due to its manifold forms. But in the end it is called 
‘money-loving part’ (because money serves to gratify appetites) and ‘appetite’.19 Now while 
appetite desires food, drink, sex and the like (580E), spirit desires predominance and victory 
and a good repute (581A).  
Not only the non-rational soul parts have desires—reason has desires too.20 The rational 
soul part is called lover of learning (φιλοµαѳές) and lover of wisdom (φιλόσοφον) because 
“it is obvious to everyone that all the endeavor of the part by which we learn is ever (ἀεί) 
towards knowledge of the truth of things” (581B). This is reason’s desire, a desire for 
knowledge and thus a desire that is satisfied when the philosopher has left the Cave and 
contemplates the Forms. This also perfectly fits the description of the philosopher in book V, 
                                                
18 R. Patterson, ‘Plato on Philosophic Character’, Journal of the History of Philosophy, 25 
(1987), 325-50. 
19 As was already pointed out by H. W. B. Joseph, Essays in Ancient & Modern Philosophy 
[Essays] (Oxford, 1935), 50-52, Plato uses ἐπιѳυµία both in the narrower sense that it is 
customary to translate as appetite, and in the wider sense of desire. All three soul parts have 
their own desires but only the desire of the appetitive part is appetite. 
20 See Joseph, Essays, 50-52; 166-168 but also J. Annas, An Introduction to Plato’s Republic 
(Oxford, 1981), 133-4; J. M. Cooper, ‘Plato’s Theory of Human Motivation’, History of 
Philosophy Quarterly, 1 (1984), 5; M. Frede, ‘Introduction’, in (id.) and G. Striker (eds.), 
Rationality in Greek Thought (Oxford, 1996), 1-28; H. Lorenz, The Brute Within. Appetitive 
Desire in Plato and Aristotle [Brute] (Oxford, 2006). Hume’s claim that reason is 
motivationally inert is foreign to Plato (Lorenz, Brute, 32-3). This can be seen, for example, 
in the discussion of the tripartition of the soul in book IV where reason is introduced as that 
part of the soul which sometimes draws back a thirsty man and prevents him from drinking 
(439AB). 
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where he is said to be the kind of person who longs for wisdom (σοφίας ἐπιѳυµητής) (475Β), 
and is distinguished from men of action (πρακτικοὶ 476B)—and it is most vividly depicted in 
book VI: “Will it not be a fair plea in his defense to say that it was the nature of the real lover 
of knowledge to strive emulously for true being and that he would not linger over many 
particulars that are opined to be real, but would hold on his way, and the edge of his passion 
would not be blunted nor would his desire fail till he came into touch with the nature of each 
thing in itself by that part of his soul to which it belongs to lay hold on that kind of reality—
the part akin to it, namely—and through that approaching it, and consorting with reality 
really, he would beget understanding (νοῦς) and truth, attain to knowledge and truly live and 
grow, and so find surcease from his travail of soul, but not before? No plea could be fairer” 
(490B).21 Note that Socrates calls this the true life of the philosopher. It is a life consisting of 
the best activity of which a human being is capable: the contemplation of Forms.22 
The true life also provides the philosopher with the greatest pleasures. In book IX the 
pleasures of the philosopher are compared with those of the money-lover and those of the 
honor-lover: “And what, said I, are we to suppose the philosopher thinks of the other 
pleasures compared with the delight of knowing the truth, what it is like (ὅπῃ ἔχει), and being 
always occupied with that while he learns? Will he not think them far removed from true 
pleasure and call them literally the pleasures of necessity since he would have no use for them 
if there was no necessity? We may be sure of that, he said” (581E). These passages explain 
perfectly well why the philosopher is disinclined to descend, and why she believes herself to 
have been transported to the Islands of the Blessed while still alive. Glaucon is thus not 
surprised when Socrates tells him “that those who have attained to this height are not willing 
to occupy themselves with the affairs of men, but their souls ever (ἀεί) feel the upward urge 
and the yearning for that sojourn above” (517C). For when the philosopher contemplates the 
                                                
21 See also 475E. 
22 See also 526E. 
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Forms, her utmost desire is fulfilled, she is in the most pleasant state a human being can be in. 
Indeed, this is, as we have seen, the true life of the philosopher—it is hard to see where 
happiness could reside if not here (cf. 526E). 
In the above passages there is no mention of any pleasures of ruling or any pleasures of 
acting justly in the Cave; nor is their any mention of corresponding desires. Non-rational 
desires are directed towards food, sex, a good reputation, etc.; and their satisfaction will 
provide human beings with some pleasure. Rational desires are directed towards knowledge 
of the truth, the satisfaction of which will be even more pleasant. If acting justly as such is 
neither desirable nor pleasant, it is hard to see how it could be constitutive of the happiness of 
a happy life; it becomes clear, however, why the philosophers are unwilling to descend: they 
prefer acting in ways that make them happy rather than in ways that do not make them happy. 
Of course, this does not imply that descending makes them unhappy. It only means that 
descending, instead of positively contributing to their happiness, makes them less happy than 
they would be if they remained outside of the Cave. If this is correct, then our initial questions 
become all the more pressing: what is it that makes them descend? Do they choose to sacrifice 
their happiness when they descend? The crucial notion for this discussion will be that of 
necessity. 
IV 
As in particular Brown has emphasized, Socrates, in his discussion of the descent of the 
philosopher kings, invokes the notion of necessity remarkably often.23 I have already 
mentioned 520C, where Socrates tells the future rulers: “down you must go!” A little earlier, 
Socrates explains that the philosopher-rulers are not allowed to remain outside of the Cave: 
“we must not allow what is now permitted.—What is that?—That they should linger there, I 
said, and refuse to go down again…” (519D). Socrates also explains that he and his 
interlocutors, as founders, compel (προσαναγκάζειν) them to take charge of the other citizens 
                                                
23 See Brown, ‘Compulsion’. 
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and be their guardians (520A). One function of the use of the notion of necessity in this 
context is the one mentioned earlier: it underlines the fact that the philosophers do not want to 
descend. But this notion is also, I think, the key to answering our two main questions. In order 
to see this, however, we have to try to get a clearer understanding of what kind of necessity is 
invoked. 
It is sometimes the case that, given the circumstances and given the kind of person one is, 
there is only one way to act. For example, if the circumstances are such that a just person must 
act in one particular way, since, were she to act otherwise (or not to act at all), she would act 
unjustly (or her not acting would be unjust), then the just person will act justly. In such 
circumstances, a certain necessity arises to act in that specific way. The question that I wish to 
consider now is whether the necessity involved in cases like this is external to the agent (e.g. 
to be found in the circumstances) or internal. I shall argue that it is internal but will first 
discuss an approach which considers the necessity as something external.24 
The philosophers do not want to descend but the city needs them to descend. Given these 
two facts, we might want to say that the city compels them to descend. This would explain the 
many occurrences of the notion of necessity, and it would account for the apparent 
unwillingness of the philosopher kings to descend. Moreover, the first problem mentioned at 
the outset of this paper would be solved: the philosophers do not want to descend, but they do 
descend because they are compelled to by the founders, or by the law, which the founders 
have given to the city.  
As a first reaction to this suggestion we might wonder why they obey the law at all. Given 
that they have all the power in the state, could they not refuse to descend, simply ignoring the 
law? Certainly no one could force them to descend since they are the people in power. This 
                                                
24 A solution of this kind has been suggested by Brown, ‘Compulsion’ and E. Brown, 
‘Minding the Gap in Plato’s Republic’ [‘Gap’], Philosophical Studies, 117 (2004), 275-302. 
For a discussion of compulsion see also D. Sedley, ‘Philosophy, the Forms, and the Art of 
Ruling’, in G. R. F. Ferrari (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Plato’s Republic 
(Cambridge, 2007). 
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worry has been convincingly addressed by Brown: “[A]ny just command the founders give to 
the philosophers will be obeyed straight-away, without need of any threats. It is as if one is 
telling a perfectly trained dog to roll over: one need not be holding a rolled-up newspaper in 
order to produce the desired effect.”25 So the philosopher kings do not have to be forced (who 
could force them?). Rather, the non-rational spirited soul part of the philosopher-rulers has 
been trained in such a way as to obey the (just) law without hesitation.26 When the (just) law 
commands them to descend, they descend. Moreover, reason allows them (and here, of 
course, they differ from dogs) to understand that the command is just. Even though reason in 
this picture possesses a certain function, it is crucially not reason that necessitates their 
descent. They are motivated to descend by their spirit and are compelled to do so by the (just) 
law. 
If the philosopher-kings are necessitated to descend by some external compulsion then 
their lives would have been better had they not been compelled to descend. Now at first sight 
this might not seem to be a problem. For, in case we had forgotten, Socrates reminds us “that 
the law is not concerned with the special happiness of any class in the state, but is trying to 
produce this condition in the city as a whole, harmonizing and adapting the citizens to one 
another by persuasion and necessity (ἀνάγκῃ), and requiring them to impart to one another 
any benefit which they are severally able to bestow upon the community” (519E-520A). So 
the philosopher-kings cannot justly expect the city to arrange things in such a way as to give 
them maximal happiness (at the expense of other citizens and of the city as a whole). 
However, this does not show that a life of pure contemplation, which they are no longer 
allowed to enjoy full-time, is not both happier than the life of the philosopher-rulers and 
available to philosophers who are in a position to ignore the just demand because their spirit is 
not well trained. Such a philosopher would not be just (he would act unjustly in ignoring the 
                                                
25 Brown, ‘Compulsion’, 13. For more details see Brown ‘Gap’. 
26 Brown, ‘Gap’, 287. 
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just demand) but he would be happier than any philosopher king—a possibility that must be 
ruled out if the just life is to be the happiest life. As I shall suggest in a moment, an 
explanation can be found if we consider the necessity as internal instead of external. 
A final remark about ‘being compelled’ (or ‘being necessitated’) (ἀναγκάζεσѳαι). It is 
true that this expression often indicates some external compulsion. However, it need not, as 
can be seen from theoretical contexts in the Republic. Two examples: at 499B Socrates makes 
a claim under compulsion of truth (τἀληѳοῦς ἠναγκασµένοι). At 505C some people are 
compelled to admit (ἀναγκάζονται ὁµολογεῖν) that there are bad pleasures. In both cases, the 
necessity arises because some rational beings have been thinking about and discussing 
something, and have rationally convinced themselves that some claims hold true. This shows 
that ‘being compelled’ (ἀναγκάζεσѳαι) and cognate expressions do not always indicate an 
external compulsion. 
It is now time to sum up the discussion so far and to see where we stand. What we would 
like to have is an interpretation according to which the philosopher kings do not desire to 
descend: all their rational craving is directed towards the Forms and they are happiest when 
contemplating. Because descending diminishes their happiness, they do not want to descend, 
although their descent is, in some sense, necessary. At least one way in which it is necessary 
is for the realization of the ideal city-state. Yet their descent is not only necessary; it is also a 
demand of justice. This is crucially emphasized by Socrates in answering a worry aired by 
Glaucon. Glaucon asks: “Do you mean to say that we must do them this wrong, and compel 
them to live an inferior life when a better life is possible for them (δυνατὸν αὐτοῖς ὂν 
ἄµεινον)?” (519D). Socrates and Glaucon conclude that they will do them no wrong since 
they command what is just to just people (520E).27 What we would like to have, however, 
goes beyond this. For we would like to have an account which not only shows that the 
philosopher kings are done no wrong when they are required to descend, but also explains 
                                                
27 δίκαια γὰρ δὴ δικαίοις ἐπιτάξοµεν. 
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that, despite their descent, their just lives are still happier than their lives would be, were they 
to ignore the just demand. 
V 
Platonists in late antiquity faced the very same problem although couched in different terms. 
It is true that political philosophy was often not foremost on their minds28 and our problem, as 
they saw it, is far removed from any political consideration. The problem—our problem in 
their terms—was the question of why the soul, stemming from an intelligible place beyond 
the heavens,29 descends into the sensible world. Plotinus discusses this problem in particular 
at Ennead IV.8, in a treatise entitled by Porphyry, the editor of Plotinus’ writings, On the 
descent of the soul into bodies. Plotinus wonders in that treatise why a thing whose nature 
belongs to the intelligible world, namely the soul, finds itself embodied in the sensible world. 
Now just as Plato’s philosopher kings have to care for the city and their fellow-citizens, so too 
the Plotinian soul has to care for a part of the sensible world, most particularly her body (Enn. 
IV.8.2). And just as Plato’s philosopher kings must descend, so Plotinian souls “necessarily 
become amphibious, living by turns the life there and the life here” (the life there being a life 
of contemplation in the intelligible world beyond the heavens, and the life here a sublunary 
life of action) (Enn. IV.8.4).30 The necessity involved is crucial. Plotinus makes it very clear 
that this necessity is not an external compulsion or anything that forces the soul to descend: it 
is a necessity that comes from within (Enn. IV.8.5). He also makes it clear that the soul by far 
prefers not to descend and that her happiness lies in the intelligible, not in the sensible, 
world.31 Acting in the sensible world is, for the soul, a necessity and not something that she 
                                                
28 But see D. J. O’Meara, Platonopolis. Platonic Political Philosophy in Late Antiquity 
(Oxford, 2003). 
29 Plato’s ὑπερουράνιος τόπος (Phdr. 247C). 
30 The claim that the soul is amphibious simply means that she is leading two sorts of life – 
not, of course, a life in water and a life on land. Rather, souls lead a life of contemplation (in 
the intelligible world) and a life of action (in the sensible world). 
31 For a more detailed account of this see D. Caluori, ‘The Essential Functions of a Plotinian 
Soul’, Rhizai, 2 (2005), 75-93. 
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desires. This can also be seen from a passage in Enn. VI.8.5 where Plotinus discusses courage 
and then emphatically states: “But it is also the same with the other activities done according 
to virtue, since virtue always must do this or that to cope with what turns up. For certainly if 
someone gave virtue itself the choice whether it would like in order to be active that there 
should be wars, that it might be brave, and that there should be injustice that it might 
determine just things and set things in order …, it would choose to rest from its practical 
activities because nothing needed its curative action, as if a physician, for instance 
Hippocrates, were to wish that nobody needed his skill.”32  
The Plotinian soul descends into the sensible world because she must descend. She has an 
understanding of the proper order of the world and the power to contribute to this order; and it 
is due to her understanding of what is good and just that she descends. However, she has as 
little desire to descend as has Hippocrates, according to Plotinus, to heal. What makes the soul 
descend is thus neither an external compulsion nor a desire to act, but a necessity that arises 
from within, from reason: what makes her descend is the ‘must’ of practical necessity.33  
Before I say more about practical necessity, let me first apply this thought to Plato’s 
philosopher kings. They have been contemplating Forms and acquired a deep understanding 
of matters such as justice. Moreover, their earlier training assures that their non-rational soul 
parts are consistently under the control of reason, so that philosopher kings never face any 
problems along the lines of akrasia. Now the moment comes, so to speak, where they have to 
descend. Socrates tells them: “You we have engendered for yourselves and the rest of the city 
to be, as it were, king-bees and leaders of the hive. You have received a better and more 
complete education than the others and you are more capable of sharing both ways of life.34 
                                                
32 This chapter can also be read as a commentary on Ar. EN X.7. 
33 For the notion of practical necessity see in particular B. Williams, ‘Practical Necessity’ 
[‘Necessity’], in (id.), Moral Luck. Philosophical Paper 1973-1980 (Cambridge, 1981), 124-
31. 
34 They are thus, like Plotinian souls, amphibious, living in turn their contemplative and their 
active lives. 
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Down you must go then, each in his turn…” (520BC). Having explained this, Socrates turns 
to Glaucon and asks: “Will our alumni then disobey us when we tell them this, and will they 
refuse to share the labors of state each in his turn while permitted to dwell the most of the 
time with one another in that purer world?” Answer: “Impossible, he said, for we shall be 
imposing just commands on men who are just. Yet they will assuredly approach office as an 
unavoidable necessity” (520DE). 
The solution is dramatically presented in a conversation between the founders of the city 
and the philosopher-kings. Yet given the supremely developed rationality of the philosopher-
kings, enlightened by their understanding of what is just and fine, they know perfectly well 
for themselves that the demand on them is just.35 They do not literally need the law or the 
founders to compel them to do what is just. The necessity of their descent, I submit, rather 
than having its origin in an external compulsion, springs from reason and understanding. We 
have already seen that reason, in its practical function, is not only a means for figuring out 
what to do; it also possesses motivational power. I would now like to add that this 
motivational power goes beyond rational desire. If reason is fully developed and informed by 
the Forms, it motivates one to do what is good and just. A just person does what is just 
precisely because she is just. 
One consequence of this claim is that philosopher kings cannot refuse to descend. Suppose, 
per impossibile (as it seems to me), that one of the philosopher kings refuses to descend and 
says: “well, you all go down but I will stay here. I do not care about the city and although I 
see that I ought to return, I shall not.” Because the understanding of the Just (in a soul whose 
non-rational soul parts are under control of reason) necessarily motivates one to act justly, it is 
impossible for a non-akratic person who understands what is just to act unjustly. Hence, a 
non-akratic person can only act unjustly if she has not understood the Just. She might, for 
                                                
35 As I said earlier, for the purposes of this paper I am taking for granted that the demand is 
just and shall discuss neither whether it is indeed so, nor whether Plato has given us sufficient 
reason to believe that it is. 
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example, wrongly believe that something unjust is just and act accordingly.  Yet such failures 
of reason are only possible for someone who has not left the Cave. 
The Plotinian suggestion developed here thus is the claim that the philosopher kings return 
to the Cave precisely because they have gained an understanding of the Good, the Just, etc. 
They must return due to a practical necessity that has its origin in their understanding of such 
Forms. If one has properly understood those normative entities (and if one’s non-rational soul 
parts are under the control of reason), it is no longer practically possible intentionally to do 
what is not good.36 Acting badly reveals either that reason is not in control of spirit and 
appetite, or that one has not properly understood the Good and the Just—and living a life of 
contemplation, although one owes it to one’s home city to return, would be an example of an 
unjust life. Yet a Platonic contemplator cannot lead a life that is both unjust and non-akratic, 
because the objects of contemplation are not just any sort of object but those normative 
entities. 
VI 
In order to clarify further what I mean by ‘practical necessity’ it is perhaps worthwhile to 
contrast it with the notion of duty. This point is related to the question of whether the 
philosopher kings sacrifice their happiness in order to do what is just.37 I have not been 
claiming that the philosopher kings recognize a duty to descend and then do what they ought 
to do, although it would have been practically possible (and more desirable) for them not to 
descend. If this were the case then they would choose to sacrifice their happiness in order to 
do what is right, even though it would have been possible for them to choose to refuse to 
return to the Cave and be happier than they are when they descend. This would still allow for 
a life that is unjust and happier than a just life.  
                                                
36 A further reason for doing what is unjust might be an error in applying one’s knowledge to 
a concrete situation. 
37 A. A. Krohn, Der platonische Staat (Halle, 1876), 161. White, ‘Choice’ and N. White, 
‘Plato’s Concept of Goodness’, in H. H. Benson (ed.), A Companion to Plato (Oxford, 2006), 
356-72. 
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The difference between the two accounts is the difference between ought and must. As 
Cavell, in his classic discussion of this distinction, says: “‘Ought’, unlike ‘must’, implies that 
there is an alternative; ‘ought’ implies that you can, if you choose, do otherwise.”38 Another 
way to explain this distinction might be to say that when I must do something, then I will do it 
but when I ought to, I might not do it. Williams states that ‘A ought to do X’, by contrast to 
‘A must do X’, “has no predictive implications about what A will do.”39 I want to claim that 
the philosopher kings must (not: ought to) return to the Cave, that it is not possible for them to 
continue their contemplation if this means disregarding the needs of the city (which justly 
asks them to return) or acting unjustly in some other way. A just person—due to her 
understanding of Justice—is incapable of (intentionally) doing what is unjust and lacks any 
motivation to do so.40 
A contrast that we find in Kant brings out precisely this difference.41 Kant thinks that not 
every will is of the same sort, but that we have to distinguish between a holy will and a finite 
(or pathologically affected) will. The human will is finite and this, in Kant’s view, is crucial 
for the human condition. What importantly distinguishes the two sorts of will is the fact that a 
holy will automatically, necessarily, and unfailingly follows reason, and motivates action 
accordingly, whereas a finite will must constrain itself and is always in danger of not 
                                                
38 See S. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say? A Book of Essays (Cambridge, 1969), 28. See 
also id., The Claim of Reason. Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy (Oxford, 
1979); Williams, ‘Necessity’; R. Wertheimer, The Significance of Sense. Meaning, Modality, 
and Morality (Ithaca and London, 1972). 
39 Williams, ‘Necessity’, 128. 
40 B. Williams, Shame and Necessity [Shame] (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1993), ch. 4, 
discusses what he calls the heroic ‘must’ that makes Sophoclean heroes do what they must do. 
It is an inner, practical necessity. Ajax, for example, sees that there is no other way for him 
than to commit suicide and expresses this by saying: “Now I am going where my way must 
go” (Ἐγὼ γὰρ εἶµ' ἐκεῖσ' ὅποι πορευτέον) (S. Aj. 690). Williams, Shame, 101, comments: 
“The necessity that Ajax recognised, was grounded in his own identity… and what mediated 
between himself and the world was his sense of shame.” For a philosopher king, by contrast, 
reason, not shame, is crucial for his identity, and by giving priority to reason over shame 
(shame belonging, in the Republic, to spirit), Plato makes reason the (ideally) dominant and 
identity-forming characteristic of human beings. In doing so, he replaces the heroic ‘must’ by 
a rational ‘must’. 
41 See A. W. Wood, Kant’s Moral Religion (Ithaca and London, 1970).  
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motivating in the way it ought to.42 Kant introduces duty with a view only to the second sort 
of will: there are no duties for divine beings (who are endowed with a holy will) precisely 
because a holy will necessarily motivates in the right way. Only persons with a finite will 
have to be told what they ought to do. Kant, of course, would not agree that any human being, 
not even a philosopher king, is endowed with a holy will (in this life, at any rate).43 This is the 
reason, I believe, why, at the end of his Toward perpetual peace, he claims that it is neither to 
be expected nor to be hoped for that philosophers become kings (or kings philosophers). For 
the possession of power would, in his view, unavoidably corrupt them.44 Plato is more 
optimistic. Platonic philosopher kings are, I submit, in this respect (and I do not want to add 
any other respect) comparable to divine Kantian beings endowed with a holy will. They are 
not subject to duty since they always, necessarily, and unfailingly do what they must.45 This 
accounts for the motivation of the philosopher kings’ descent and so answers the first question 
posed at the beginning of this paper. 
VII 
Let us now see what it implies for the second question and the happiness of the philosopher 
kings. Do they sacrifice their happiness for justice? Has Socrates fulfilled his promise to show 
that the just are always happier than the unjust? Let us look again at 519D where Glaucon 
asks: “Do you mean to say that we must do them this wrong, and compel them to live an 
inferior life when a better life is possible for them?” The answer to this question is, as we have 
seen, that the philosopher kings will not refuse to descend, because they, being just, are asked 
                                                
42 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Ak 4:414 (Ak = Akademieausgabe). 
43 “It is impossible for [a holy being] to will something which is contrary to moral laws…” By 
contrast to the holy being, “every creature… also has inclinations which do not always agree 
with morality. Thus the human being can never be holy” (Kant, Lectures on the Philosophical 
Doctrine of Religion, Ak 28:1075). 
44 Kant, Toward Perpetual Peace, Ak 8:369. See H. Karpp, ‘Die Philosophenkönige bei Platon 
und bei Kant’, Gymnasium, 60 (1953), 334-8. 
45 This does not at all imply that they are not free. In one of Michael Frede’s last articles, he 
argues that there is only one proponent of a libertarian view of freedom in antiquity, 
Alexander of Aphrodisias. See M. Frede, ‘The ἐφ’ ἡµῖν in Ancient Philosophy’, 
ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΙΑ, 37 (2007), 110-23. 
Damian Caluori, Reason and Necessity: the Descent of the Philosopher-Kings 
 20 
to do what is just (520E). Their decision to descend is grounded in their being just and in the 
fact that it is just to descend. It is not possible for them, as I tried to show above, to remain 
outside of the Cave. If this is correct, then, as a consequence, a better life is not possible for 
them. True, they would prefer to remain outside of the Cave, but this is impossible. So they 
descend without enthusiasm. 
Their limited happiness is the greatest amount of happiness they can possibly have.46 As 
Socrates explains already in book IV: “Don’t expect us, quaint friend, to paint the eyes so fine 
that they will not be like eyes at all … And so in the present case you must not require us to 
attach to the guardians a happiness that will make them anything but guardians” (420DE). So 
the philosopher kings are as happy as it is possible for them, as philosopher kings, to be. A 
life of pure contemplation would be more attractive and happier, even divine. But it is, for 
them (and a fortiori for the other citizens), impossible to have—impossible in the sense 
explained above.47 If this is true, the philosopher-rulers do not sacrifice their happiness. 
There is still a tragic touch to the lot of the philosopher kings: they lose what they have 
been longing for, when, and because, they have finally acquired it: it is due to their having 
seen the Forms that they must return back into the Cave. This is, however, only mildly tragic. 
For each philosopher-ruler, in her turn, devotes “the greater part of their time to the study of 
philosophy” (540B). Only when the turn comes to them, they toil “in the service of the state 
and [hold] office for the city’s sake, regarding the task not as a fine thing but a necessity” 
(ibid.). Thus, they can still spend most of their time outside of the Cave and thus in happy 
contemplation. Because they lead these two kinds of life, they lead just lives of action which 
                                                
46 See also Cooper, ‘Justice’. 
47 The philosophers who grow up spontaneously at 520B (and do not owe any city anything) 
differ from the philosopher kings in that they do not have to rule a city, so that, perhaps, an 
even happier life is possible for them. This is perfectly compatible with the account presented 
in this paper since their lives are just lives too. Yet note that although not all necessities arise 
for every philosopher, even philosophers who do not have to rule will nevertheless (being 
human) be confronted with many necessities. 
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are still as happy as it is possible. Acting justly is a necessity—but the just life is nevertheless 
the happiest life possible for a human being. 
Trinity University 
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